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Abstract: The social expectation of efficiency against criminal investigation is formulated more and 
more vigorously. The efficiency of investigations can be apprehended through exploring the statistically 
measurable criteria of success and also through applying the rules of criminal procedure law legally and 
expertly. The police fulfil all these with strictly obeying the legal and professional regulations enforced by 
the prosecution. However, the result-centric requirement system makes the whole criminal jurisdiction 
system counter-productive if the directing conditions and activity competences of the structure and the 
function of the subsystems (the prosecution, the police) are not settled clearly along a uniform efficiency 
aim philosophy. Their own internal functional management adjusted to the general function of the police 
can easily conflict with the criminal investigation activity directed by the prosecution. For this reason, only 
creating the legal institution of cooperation between the subsystems can make way for improving the whole 
jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
In Hungary, investigation is done by the police under the judicial supervision and effective professional 
direction of the prosecution, which has little independence in initiating diversion procedure methods. Le-
gally, thus it is hardly appreciated that first investigation authorities get into contact in time and space with 
events happening in the outworld and  having relevance from a criminal law point of view. May attention 
get lost over the condition that the investigation authority operates a kind of selection mechanism in the 
form of hidden diversions1 under the pressure of efficiency expectations and necessity, and also in the 
lack of simple diversions2? Surely, yes. American lawyers studying the European procedure systems 
has also pointed at: ’the principle of compulsory procedure requires the impossible: enforcement of 
the law, meanwhile delinquency and violent struggle for obtaining goods are increasing. There is an 
imperative necessity for changes with leaving principles in force, and where formal law or ideology 
do not make it possible, informal procedures must be worked out.’3 Today it is a banal establishment 
that jurisdiction authorities doing criminal investigation are able to deal with only a particular pro-
portion of the cases, since all the crimes cannot be revenged, and neither structural changes nor staff 
increase mean a solution.4 
1  Simple diversion means giving up criminal procedure without consequences either in the investigation phase but before the verdict. 
These are actions with minor danger to the society so using any punitive sanction is not reasonable. The burdens of justice are mainly 
reduced by cases which do not reach trial.
2  In those legal systems where the principle of legality succeeds, police cannot use diversion if they get to know about a crime from 
any source, they have to initate the procedure ex officio. However, hidden diversion creates such a scope for action which police can 
use when they talk the complainer out of bagatelle actions which seem to be unsuccessful , they do not make the report, they do not 
take measures in case of reporting. It also has the result that there will be no cases and procedures in case of minor actions.  in Blau: 
Diversion und Strafrecht. Jura.1987.S.29.
3  Goldstein, Abraham S. and Marcus, Martin(1998): The Myth of Judicial Supervision inThree „Inquisitirial” Systems: France Italy 
and Germany. The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 87: 240, 1977. p. 280. in: Kertész Imre: A legalitás eróziója, az opportunitás inváziója, Magyar 
Jog, April 1998. p.152.
4  Sléder Judit (2010): A büntetőeljárás megindítása. (PhD. manuscript), Pécs.p.140.
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THE EFFICIENCY AWKWARDNESS 
OF THE SUBSYSTEM HIERARCHY
The inevitable dimension of the efficiency of criminal procedure closely related to the diversions of the 
efficiency of criminal procedure is the institutional hierarchy of the two penal jurisdiction subsystems. Its 
straight and logical consequence is that the subordination of the elements depending on each other in their 
forms of activities – for lack of assuring scope for action based on mutuality and confidence – can inevita-
bly cause the injury of the efficiency of the whole system. ’Directing operation and directing activities are in 
interaction with each other. The latter depends on the former. Directing operation assures the budgetary con-
tribution for the organization, establishes the organization, its structure, personnel decisions are settled there, 
and it has an effect on the employees’ qualification. High-standard, legal activity and its direction theoretically 
suppose the perfect direction of operation. Otherwise functional disorders can happen in the field of law en-
forcement, the efficiency of directing activity will be smaller. Directing activity is exposed to directing operation, 
at the same time law settles responsibility for directing investigation on the prosecutor who directs the activity.’5
The drawback of criminal procedure going on beside the investigation-principled and  hierarchic func-
tional direction – because of the multi-levelled character of the inquisitoric system – is the compulsion of 
repetition coming from the claim to ’supervision’, which for the lack of appreciation of levels built on each 
other and not next to each other, with repeating the former activity again it causes the slowing down of 
the whole procedure and because of its retrospective principle it causes the decrease of its recognition op-
portunity. In the mixed system the literature of the inquisitoric6 model, which especially cares for obeying 
procedure guarantees, reduces the information distortion of the multi-level procedure caused by the loss of 
efficiency, which is practically suppressed by the court dominance of the accusatoric7 elements of modern 
rules of law. It can mostly be taken for granted that it would cause the damage of the success of verification 
if we would not allow the verification results of the investigation phase cited by procedural law solutions 
one by one.8 In this way, the mixed system can be called upon to account for the efficiency loss caused by re-
peating  the results of the investigation phase at the trial, which have logically led to the headway of the role 
of verification guarantees in the investigation phase, and with it to the  widening of legality counter success 
dimension. On the other hand, with the phenomenon of maximizing success it suffers the other ’disadvan-
tage’ coming from the dependence of the investigation authority on the prosecution, which is assessed as 
an executive compulsion of redundant  investigation and verification actions by the investigation authority. 
The question is worth placing into a system aspect and seeing the tangible fact that in case of such open 
systems9 as jurisdiction there is an interdependence between the subsystems. Meanwhile they have a rela-
tive autonomy when performing their duties, but they endeavour to preserve their independence which can 
come into conflict with the endeavour of the whole system, i.e. its overall aims. This statement is also true 
for the relation of the certain elements, as Connidis indicates, conflicts between subsystems can also derive 
from that the certain subsystems attempt to keep different degrees of functional autonomy. ’It is most likely 
that while an organization attempts to maximize its own functional autonomy and endeavours to minimize 
others’ subsystem, it can originate tension and conflict between them.’10 
Connecting the relation of the prosecution and the investigation authority mutually, confidentially but 
not dependently, or though dependently but connecting their activities and operation directions, is signif-
icantly related to the loss of efficiency of the whole jurisdictional system. Since if diversion before the trial 
– prosecutor and police - dominates, criminal procedure also accelerates, in this way the input capacity of 
the system can increase, consequently the capacity of the investigation authority will be bigger as well. For 
all this, though, broadening the formal ’diversionary’ initiative opportunities of the investigation authority, 
perhaps making the written work of the investigation phase more simple, furthermore differentiating the 
order of procedures according to their weight are needed. Consequently, the improving ability of dealing 
with cases will be realized in the larger number of registrated crimes, in the increase of social prestige appre-
ciating more effective criminal investigation behaviour, and in the orientation of decreasing punitive policy.
5  Nyíri Sándor (2003): Az ügyészség és a nyomozóhatóság kapcsolata. Belügyi Szemle. Issue 7-8.p. 64.
6  The procedure is written and secret. It has a fixed verification system, its result is the file, defence is within narrow bounds, the 
procedure and legal remedy system have several levels. etc. 
7  The principle of verbality, publicity and directness predominates. The principle of free verification system and sharing functions 
dominates which is realized in relation to characteristic defender’s rights.
8  A büntetőeljárásról szóló XIX. törvényt (Be. tv.) amendment of 2010. évi CLXXXIII., among others 291§,296§,299§, 301§.
9  Farkas Ákos (2002): A falra akasztott nádpálca avagy a büntető igazságszolgáltatás hatékonyságának korlátai. Osiris kiadó. pp.28-29.
10  Connidis, Ingrid Arnet (1982): Rethinking of CriminalJustice Research. A systemperspective. Holt, Rinehart and Winston of 
Canada Limited. p.32.
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SUCCESS DIMENSION AS AN EFFICIENCY OBSTACLE 
IN THE RELATION OF THE PROSECUTION 
AND INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY SUBSYSTEMS
Apprehending the notion it seems to be expedient to examine the summary opinion of the penal board 
of the „Kúria”11 which analyses legal practice. When examining the legality of the accusation, the Analyser 
Team came to the conclusion that the existence of the indicium and increasing it towards verification dur-
ing criminal procedures – on the basis of rationality and legality – is enough guarantee to eliminate hidden 
diversions, also terminating illegal procedures determined by ’success view’. ’ There is no reason to assume 
that a criminal procedure starts with a ’blind investigation’, ’goes on track’ and cannot be stopped – sticking to 
the example it stays on track -, ’its success’ produces a perpetrator who becomes a convict, in comparison with it, 
high accusation success is the negative figure of criminal procedures, the self-justification of the office.’12 The se-
rious deficiency of this argumentation is that it neglects the uncontrollable human and structural ’elements’. 
The investigation authority gets to know and finds out past actions immediately and directly, and assesses 
them immediately.13 Its efficiency can be assured with practicing it which, however, bumps into resistance 
with the hierarchic and normative expectation system of the prosecution which directs activities. That is 
the seemingly thorough regulation exactly which locks the investigation authority into the stocks of ’success 
endeavour’ and, blocking criminal investigation, makes it the playground of the discretionary scope for 
action of law enforcement. ’On the other hand, the pejorative, negative meaning of accusation success based 
on the ’weakness’ and compliance of the court, is not relevant as well. It , that is, neglects that the risk of accu-
sation is lower and its possible success is higher in a system where investigation is regulated.(…) In case of a not 
regulated investigation the risk of accusation – obviously – is higher and, consequently, the rate of its success is 
lower.The standpoint which ’accuses’ the high rate of accusation success, neglects that there are not fewer but 
more criminal procedures because investigations are regulated.’14 Being regulated cannot increase the rate of 
accusation success because the success of investigation dissolves in the success of accusation only in theory, 
otherwise, it has its own success objectives and performance measuring system. The success of accusation 
can be seen clearly only in the mirror of the success of investigation and reconnaissance, deducing from it, 
it is not difficult to understand that in case of limited sources, the compulsion of selecting cases appears in 
all phases of the investigation. It increases the number of selecting cases and of illegal procedures as well, 
by increasing regulations and by the stress of over-proving. In this way, efficiency will not be assessed in 
the correspondence of the mutual result factors of the two systems, but much rather in the performance 
evaluation principles which qualify the work structure of the independent subsystems. 
It is also well demonstrated by the considerably different objective figures: namely the rate of investiga-
tion success and accusation success. Accusation success15 is mainly the proof whether the ’cases of accusa-
tion’16 are suitable for verification, and not the proof of investigation success.17 The prosecutor helps cases 
being suitable for accusation by the right of giving orders to do real verifications. ’Accusation success is pri-
marily the consequence of the success of the investigation – and only in accordance with this, the representation 
of accusation. That is, accusation success cannot be regarded a negative category by itself.’18 To tell the truth, 
accusation success can only be regarded a negative category when comparing it to low investigation success, 
if the investigation authority select  cases or the diversionary toolbar is out of their reach.
The investigation authority may only reach vital efficiency improvement in case of promoting informal 
and confidence-based relation with the prosecution which directs the investigation. In other countries the 
high rate of accusation success is not inevitably the result of the regulation of investigation, as the differenti-
ated judgment of cases may have an important role there, and as a result of it, cases reaching trial are bound 
to suffer smaller informal selection mechanism before the inquiry phase19 of investigation. It demonstrates 
quite well that in Anglo-Saxon countries cases ending in a confession do not reach trial, relieving courts 
with it.
11  The highest judiciary authority of Hungary, its former name was the Supreme Court.
12  A vád törvényességének vizsgálata. 2013.Összefoglaló Vélemény. Kúria, Büntető Kollégium, Joggyakorlat elemző Csoport. 2013.
EI.II.E.1/4. April 2014. p.12.
13  The investigation authority is the first who get into touch with the case and decide on primary measures. The proper penal clas-
sification of the action will be a decisive aspect when determining the mode and degree of reaction, and the chance of predictable, 
successful, effective clearing up in a certain case have a significant impact on it. 
14  A vád törvényességének vizsgálata (2014) i.m. p.12.
15  In Hungary the success of accusation is 96-97% .
16  Cases sent to the prosecution from the investigation authority with a proposal of accusation.
17  The success of investigation is the invert of successful and unsuccessful cases which practically depends on the result of cases 
which have come to the knowledge of the investigation authority, and in which investigation have been ordered. On nation wide level 
it currently shows a decreasing tendency of 30-40% depending on the certain investigation authority levels.
18  A vád törvényességének vizsgálata (2014). i.m. p.12.
19  See later the application conditions of the Austrian criminal procedure law diversions used by the prosecutor.
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The determinant of the relation system is practically the different success mission and partial interde-
pendence, furthermore dependence on each other. The prosecution expect cases of proper quality, which 
are revealed and investigated, and suitable for accusation, on the other hand, the investigation authority 
expect fewer other verification tasks and other restrictions, respectively measures deriving from legality 
worries. Today both subsystems struggle with significant overload, in this way the own diversion action 
plan of the prosecution – which definitely finds shape in expedited or consensus procedures - does not 
inevitably work properly because of the overload of the investigation authority, for lack of co-ordinating the 
operation direction of the two work-organizations.
THE REMEDIES OF EFFICIENCY CRISIS: DIVERSION 
AND DIFFERENTIATION
The increase of significant burden of cases and the lack of resources urged penal jurisdiction systems 
to operate filters in the different levels of criminal procedure which let only some parts of cases go further, 
in this way they release the further elements of the system.20 The first jurisdiction participant filling the 
part of such a formal21 filter is the prosecutor. The Recommendations of the Council of Europe urge 
that the discretionary authority of the prosecutor must be extended so that cases with less impor-
tance should not get to the court, but get stuck at the prosecutor.22 It is not essential, on the contrary 
in many cases it is not expedient, that a case gets to the court phase. The range of the authority of 
considering cases is largely determined by the principles of the criminal procedures of the certain 
states. whether they are based on the principle of legality23 or on the principle of opportunity.24
Even before the R (87) 18. Recommendation, the dilemmas of jurisdiction were outlined by 1970, 
which demanded urgent solutions. Kerezsi named three main sources of ’crisis’:
1) experimental crisis: caused by those research results which questioned the efficiency of rehabilitative 
treatment;
2) resource crisis: caused by the increasing number of convicts in penitentiary institutions;
3) theoretical crisis: caused by the authorization of using discretion by treatment institutions.’25
The well-known management attitude of enterprises offered a solution to the challenges of efficiency, 
which made its way into the organizational reform of criminal jurisdiction.
The development of management attitude had an effect on four fields of jurisdiction:
1) organization development;
2) the tasks and functions of institutions;
3) appearing efficiency and success viewpoints in the assessment;
4) reforming the personnel of criminal jurisdiction organizations.’26
In consequence of the new attitude, more and more diversion forms appeared in the criminal proce-
dures of the different legal systems, since these may obviously and significantly reduce the costs of criminal 
procedures.
Similarly, the double gauge penal politics meant a breakthrough – under the aegis of efficiency – by the 
80ies and 90ies, which is the separation of the perpetrators of slight crimes from the perpetrators of seri-
ous crimes (significant crimes, qualified cases, halmazat, multiple violent recidivous criminals). Both were 
treated differently, different procedures were added to the two categories. Different alternative punishments 
can be used in larger numbers against perpetrators of slighter crimes, emphasizing diversion which could 
reduce not only the work-load of courts, moreover, it was cost efficient, and also had reparation solutions 
against the participants of the procedure. As Korinek said in 2003: ’Against bagatelle criminality it is more 
expedient to spread the conflict solving practice of alternative sanctions which have more and more civil law 
elements.’27
20  Miskolci László (2001): Egy konferencia tanulságai, avagy a magyar büntetőeljárás továbbfejlesztésének az ügyész-e a kulcsszerep-
lője. Ügyeszek Lapja  Vo.1. p. 20.
21  The investigation authority filter and select with the suspicion and the classification, but it is not a formal or simple diversion.
22  R (87) 18. számú Ajánlás, a büntetőeljárás egyszerűsítéséről, furthermore R (2000) 19. számú Ajánlás
23  In systems based on the principle of legality, the prosecution is obliged to urge that all perpetrators of all crimes will be called to 
account. In: Bócz Endre (1994): Legalitás, opportunitás és az ügyész diszkrecionális jogköre, Rendészeti Szemle, pp.12-18.
24  On  the other hand,  in systems based on opportunity, authorities have a wide range of discretionary authority, and decides on 
practical consideration which cases to investigate.
25  Kerezsi, Klára (2006): Kontroll vagy támogatás: az alternatív szankciók dilemmája.  Budapest, CompLex Kiadó Jogi és Üzleti 
Tartalomszolgáltató Kft. p.208.
26  Kerezsi: (2006) i.m. p. 209.
27  Korinek, László (2003): Tendenciák. Belügyi Szemle. Vo.1. p.63.
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In order to achieve a more efficient activity, it is a requirement that the criminal procedure law assures 
enough possibility for the crime investigation authority to synchronize its resources. The contradiction de-
riving from the differences of the activities and operation direction of the investigation authority, is treated 
completely differently by those European countries which have bigger past of law or more pragmatic atti-
tude. The question, independently from the type of the legal system, shows a connection with the theoret-
ical concern of some main procedural criteria or principles, such as legality, opportunity or the application 
scope of diversions.
R (95) 12 EUROPEAN COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ABOUT 
THE MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
This significant European Council recommendation deals with the management system of the criminal 
jurisdiction system from the side of efficiency. The aim of the recommendation is to promote the efficient 
and successful criminal jurisdiction. With respect to it, the recommendation drafts the managing princi-
ples, strategies and procedures of jurisdiction.
The recommendation outlines four models to achieve efficiency and success:
− the latosensu ’procedure law’ model, which reduces the number of cases, on new criminalpolitical 
considerations;
− the strictosensu ’procedure law’ model, which aims to simplify cases;
− the ’management’ model which wishes to realize the most optimal utilization of resources and to 
increase the performance of the system;
− the ’financial’ model, which wishes to achieve the above mentioned aims with assuring financial re-
sources.28
The rationalization aspect of the structural management of the recommendation lies on the apprecia-
tion of the significance of the principles as follows:
− Dividing workload inside the organization.
− Managing infrastructure whic mainly means geographical and material allocation.
− Managing human resources – efficient management of human resources, training and career system, 
and optimising the amount of work compared to the personnel.
− Information and communication – outer and inner information management and the methods of 
keeping contact with citizens.29
The principles of the recommendation mainly have suggestions in connection with management struc-
tures in terms of efficiency, in contradiction to the R (87) 18 recommendation which arranges strictosensu 
procedure30 law questions, and which mainly gives opportunity and diversion patterns in order to simplify 
criminal procedure. Another much earlier European Council Recommendation also declares the funda-
mental demand of acceleration: ’ everything must be done in order to shorten the time needed for decisions 
in a case.’31 This principle corresponds to the European Treaty of Human Rights paragraph 6, point 1, here-
inafter Treaty, and in accordance with it, the delay of court equals with refusing jurisdiction.32 Therefore 
there is a need for revising old legal institutions, and for assuring the adequate number of personnel and 
equipment. 
’WASTED’ CHANCE: THE CONCEPT OF THE CURRENTLY EFFEC-
TIVE XIX. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF 1998
Nearly 20 years ago, in 1994 the Government made the concept of the new criminal procedure law 
public, in the form of government regulation.33 In it the government drafted that the main task of inves-
tigation is to inform the department of the prosecutor, thus investigation must fundamentally aim to 
28  R (95) 12. számú Ajánlás a büntető igazságszolgáltatás irányításáról
29  Nagy, Anita (2007): Eljárást gyorsító rendelkezések a büntetőeljárás bírósági szakaszában (PhD thesis). Miskolc.p.164. (downlo-
aded: 11 June 2014.)
30  Reccomendation No. (87)18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning the simplification of criminal justice 
(Adopted by theCommittee of Ministers on 17 September 1987 at the 410th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies)
31  R (81) 7 számú Ajánlás B/6. pont
32  R (81) 7 számú Ajánlás C/8. elv
33  2002/1994.(I.17.) Korm. határozat a büntetőeljárásjog koncepciójáról
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clear up the current evidentiary methods, not to put down the proving facts. Except the unrepeatable 
verification actions, knowledges acquired during evidentiary methods do not have to be written 
down. 
The codification conception wanted to develop such a system of calling to account, in which respon-
sibility is decided at the trial, in respect of the principle of immediacy, and in which the principle of con-
tradiction is more dominated, within it the right of disposal of the parties. The conception determined the 
aspects of developing the new law in eight points, and one of the points was the enforcement of the principle 
of function division, clearly defining the tasks of the police, the prosecutor and the judge. Furthermore, 
besides the dominance of the basic procedure, creating simplified procedures in order to differently judge 
cases. During investigation, detailed written work may be omitted in case of parts of the cases, because it 
has no guarantee significance. Judging certain crimes – especially economic crimes – makes it essential to 
prepare the cases properly for the trial. In those procedures, of course, documentary evidence is dominated 
and it requires the judge to bring them to the trial with an up to date method.34
The question arises with reason in the process of legislation that how the reform of organizational or-
der relates to the reform of procedure law, which has bigger density. organizational reform was put to the 
second place, so it is always exposed to the current financial situation, so procedure law is forced to wait for 
coming into effect. 
It was regarded as an evidence that within the order of procedure, in connection with  clearing up, 
establishing, considering and assessing the facts, inquisition and accusation elements must be in balance. 
’Another evidence, can be generalized, is that a procedure has two equal phases, and it would not be appro-
priate if they built on each other or fell behind each other. They would lead to repeated mechanism or needless 
repetition and both harm criminal jurisdiction. Either because, though the decision will be non-appealable but 
it will not be satisfying, or because timeliness deteriorates. Therefore the regulation is correct if the basis of the 
procedure is the facts established during the investigation and accused, but there is no need to give the case back 
for a supplementary investigation if completion of verification is needed.’35
The third evidence was connected to the performance of the authority. According to international ex-
perience, the procedure form standing on the ground of legality could not be hold for more. Its slight cor-
rection was the suspension of the investigation against the accused who cooperated. Though, connected 
to several other forms of judicial proceedings, opportunity was put into the act, which left the ’broker’ 
position to the prosecutor, so the prosecutor could decide using more simple forms of procedure. At the 
same time, - deteriorating the main rule – the act assured the opportunity of independent investigation for 
investigation authorites as well, and gave them the authority of making decisions without the contribution 
of the prosecutor, without an injury on the principle of legality. On the other hand, such elements were not 
introduced which would have mixed the elements of the Anglo-Saxon trial with continental law. Instead 
of the radical reform of the legal institution, the scheduled ’reorganization’ of jurisdiction seemed to be the 
passable road, which was mainly reasoned with the inflexibility of law enforcement.36 Thus seemingly, in 
spite of a considerable re-regulation, the organization did not follow the notion of the act in all detail. 
The relation between the criminal investigation departments of the police and the prosecution was 
not set to the reform, and their organization structure was not reorganized according to the changes 
of procedure order, which was thanked to the ’fulfilment’ of urgent political will. ’If the social-political 
and professional conditions of organizational reform are not given, such modification of the procedure 
law is needed which restores harmony between law and its enforcer.’37
Beyond the fail of organizational changes, it was a vain hope to expect much from formal reliefs. ’I think 
that the new Criminal Procedure Law rehabilitates criminalistics with the codification of other data obtaining 
activities of the investigation authority and with the authorization of reports which substitute police records 
(168.§). It gives a wide-ranging opportunity for the investigation authority to find out – under less formal and 
bureaucratic circumstances - where, how and what further knowledge can be obtained, and in what respect 
they help to reconstruct past actions. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the main aim of investigation – especially 
in case of personal evidences - must be not creating evidences and records of evidence being used directly in 
court. Wider space must be given for the investigation authority to inform the prosecuting about verification 
opportunities.’38
So the endeavour has failed, procedure order has got back to what it was like the act of 1973.I. in many 
respects.39 During professional debates, however, many experts objected that if concessions were 
34  Ügyészségi értesítő.  Volume XXX. 1994. Issue 1. p.7. 
35  Márki Zoltán (2003): Az új büntetőeljárási törvény és újdonságai. Belügyi Szemle. Issue 7/8. p. 11.
36  Nagy Zsolt- Kovács Judit: A társadalmi szabályok hatása a büntetőeljárási szabályokra a rendszerváltozás után. http://jesz.ajk.elte.
hu/kovacs6.html (downloaded: 10 June 2014.)
37  Korinek, László (2007): A bűnügyi tudományok helyzete. Magyar Tudomány. Volume 12.http:/ /www.matud.iif.hu/07dec/10.html 
(downloaded: 2 June 2014.)
38  Bócz, Endre (2003): Az eljárásjogi törvény és a kriminalisztika. Belügyi Szemle. Issue 7-8. p. 43.
39  Kadlót, Erzsébet (2004): A jogbizonytalanság múzeuma, avagy barangolások az új büntetőeljárási törvény útvesztőiben. Magyar 
Jog. Issue 1. p. 8.
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made in written work – for example, testimonies, evidentiary facts were not written down -, guaran-
tees would suffer damage. Courts has also indicated that in those cases trials will not be well prepared 
and they cannot prepare for questioning the accused and witnesses. They managed to reach that in-
vestigation means not only collecting verification methods but fixing evidentiary facts ’surronded by 
guarantees’ as well. Unrestricted time frame means that the legislator is definitely generous with the 
prosecution when prolonging investigation deadlines, and therefore today in almost every non-pat-
terned cases investigation lasts for several months and quite often for years. During that, witnesses 
are interrogated and confronted several times, several hundred or thousand pages of investigation 
document are made, making the preparations of the court ’easier’. Such an investigation inevitably 
orients the court – which conscientiously studies the documents of the investigation - towards ac-
cusation. Has it become a more constitutional state with the investigation verification? Recognition 
during investigation is one-way, approach is determined and subjective, investigation has become 
full circle and more time-consuming. Recording investigation and verification testimonies is ex-
tremely shifted. The judge’s interest is to uphold all the testimonies, otherwise the case cannot be eas-
ily and simply judged. The primacy of judiciary verification must be increased, and most evidences 
would happen there. It would have the advantage of shortening the time of procedures and timeliness 
in procedures would improve.40
Bánáti clearly considers the exaggerated subordination to the prosecutor as the weakening of the consti-
tutional state, and the deceleration of procedures is thanked to overvaluing the role of investigation, and he 
finds the only proper solution if the border of the judiciary main phase is shifted and relocated. It basically 
leads to the same initial dilemma, which has been sharpened during the debates before the codification 
and in connection with the conception, and as a result of enforcing interests, it resulted in the supremacy of 
courts, in the undervaluation of the formal role of investigation, in practice – agreeing with Bánáti – in the 
spreading the dominance of criminal work.
The Achilles heel of the question is rather hidden in increasing the scope for action of the investigation 
authority, in differentiating procedures on the basis of summary, and in initiating and conducting diver-
sions by the investigation authority. It is also verified that the regulation reducing the scope for action of 
the former Criminal Procedure Law has been broken through by the practical claim caused by overload, 
which has brough several former legal institutions back under the pressure of compulsion.41 However, 
the differentiated easing solution of miner offence procedure has totally got out from the act, so the 
investigation authority has been left without summary procedure differentiation based on criminal 
law.42 Because of its efficiency mission and work organization overload, simple and easily investigated cases 
have bacome primary, its ’hidden’ diversionary selection activity has become even stronger.
Seeking the solution, it can be easily found out that the contradiction might be resolved from two di-
rections: on the one hand, widening diversionary opportunities and introducing procedural differentiation 
based on criminal law. On the other hand, in case of fundamental procedures besides summary procedures, 
by resolving the contradiction of success of the subsystem, the operation management of the examination 
work organization should be placed under the prosecution. 
INSTEAD OF SUMMARY
Besides the previously explained structural efficiency obstacles, other questions arise in managing the 
efficiency crisis of criminal investigation as well. Such question, among others, is the ’pyramid’-like model43 
which regulates the authority of the investigation authority, and it gives disproportionately a lot of cases to 
the local investigation authority, overloading its capacity – with a rigid and unjustified allocation – with it. 
Besides, it also holds the possibility of transfering cases from superior organizations, and the local investi-
gation authority has no chance to protest against it, though, because of its current overload it is not able to 
investigate at a high standard. On the other hand, the Criminal Procedure Law does not distinguish simple 
and fundamental procedures, so in case of offence investigations of minor importance, investigation is done 
with the same compulsion of „over-assurance’ and guarantee. Simple investigations might expressly be dif-
ferentiated within the scope of cogent independent procedures and with strict enumeration in the Penal 
Code. Its main reason is that it is complicated and time consuming to investigate crimes and these features 
can be imagined neither in the duality of offence and crime, nor in the level of the sanction. The basis of the 
enumeration is made by cases of simple factual and legal judgement falling within the competence of local 
40  Bánáti, János (2011): Gyorsítás versus garanciák. A magyar büntetőjogi társaság jubileumi tanulmánykötete. Budapest-Debre-
cen-Pécs, pp. 209-219.
41  example: 172/A. § Feljelentés kiegészítése
42  Investigation in minor offence procedures on the basis of the Act 1973. évi I. tv.  
43  The structure of the criminal investigation authority of the police is pyramid-schemed, rigid and hierarchic on the base of 25/2013. 
(VI.24.) BM rendelet. 
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authorities, and which appear in large numbers. There is a social and legal-political demand on fast and ef-
ficient investigations, which requires the fast and successful solution of such cases. The simplifying method 
of investigations causes the capacity increase of criminal investigation authorities, which will be realized in 
improving quality and in activating crime prevention. 
The diversionary output of cases is similarly weakened that initiating consensual procedure (me-
diatory procedure) belongs to the authority of the prosecution. The standpoint can be hardly defend-
ed, that if there is the intention of consensus from both sides, the suspect has admitted the action, 
and able to and willing to compensate the damage, finishing the criminal procedure in such a way 
will depend on the decision of the law enforcer.44 Considering the perpetrator, recidivous perpetrators 
would be given the chance of such a finish not more than once, but in case of multiple or special recidivous 
perpetrators it would be clearly excluded. The nature of the crime would also be considered by the cogent 
regulation in form of enumering concrete chapters. Crimes which appear in relatively large numbers can-
not be excluded from this circle, such as rowdyism or crimes related to documents. In those cases, after 
recompensing the damage for the offended, the prosecutor would order doing social, useful work in the 
form of diversion if the perpetrator accepts it. If the perpetrator does not perform it within the given dead-
line because of his own fault, the investigation and the criminal procedure may be done within the scope 
of plenary suit.
The empirical examination of the researcher who examines the efficiency of investigation has also sup-
ported that the procedural forms of differentiated calling to account – thus the simplified procedures – are 
in positive connection with the efficiency of procedures. Evidentiary rules used during judging cases of 
simple factual and legal judgement and the confession of the accused contribute to that in 90% of the exam-
ined sample, the case would be end with establishing criminal responsibility.45
As an epilogue, nothing would be more expressive than quoting professor Farkas Ákos as an authentic 
answer to the initial question of ’why is it important to improve the efficiency of criminal jurisdiction?’: ’ 
The bigger the tension is between the expectations against criminal jurisdiction, the sense of security of the so-
ciety and the performance of the jurisdiction system, the bigger the chance is of emerging a repressive-autoriter 
criminalpolitics.’46
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